

dishonourable and deceitful practices';<sup>13</sup> this description precisely fits Hyperbolus' character and the common meaning of Modern Persian *mardak/mardekeh*, so it is quite likely that Old Persian *marika*<sup>h</sup> had already acquired this sense.

Let us now review the evidence for why Eupolis selected the Persian word *Μαρικᾶς* to designate Hyperbolus. Cassio has cited several passages (Plato com., fr. 170 Kock, Polyzeios, fr. 5 Kock, Scholia in Aristophan. *Pacem* 692) in which Hyperbolus was variously accused of being a Lydian, a Phrygian, and a Syrian, and he has also noted that the scholion *πρὸς τ[ὸν] δεσπότην ὁ Ὑπέρβολος* in a recently published papyrus commentary on Eupolis' *Μαρικᾶς* shows that Hyperbolus was portrayed as a slave, as indeed had been inferred from Plato's *Hyperbolus*, fr. 166–7 Kock, where a servant tells his master

ὅτι πονηρῶ καὶ ξένῳ  
ἐπέλαχες ἀνδρί, οὐδέπω γὰρ ἐλευθήρῳ,

and a little later the master says

ἄπερρ'· ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα δὴ φράσω·  
'Ὑπερβόλῳ βουλῆς γάρ, ἄνδρες, ἐπέλαχον.

Similar allegations were made by Andocides, fr. 3.2 = Scholia in Aristophan. *Vesp.* 1007: *περὶ Ὑπερβόλου λέγειν αἰσχύνομαι, οὐδ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἐστιγμένος ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ ἀργυροκοπείᾳ δουλεῖται τῷ δημοσίῳ, αὐτὸς δὲ ξένος ὢν καὶ βάρβαρος λυχνοποιεῖ*. Furthermore, as we have already seen, Hyperbolus was notorious for his knavish character. The single word *μαρικᾶς* conveyed all three charges: its Persian origin alluded to Hyperbolus' Asiatic background, its meaning 'slave' conveyed the allegation that Hyperbolus was a slave, and its connotation 'scoundrel' reflected Hyperbolus' notorious reputation for deceitfulness. We may admire Eupolis' brilliance in choosing *μαρικᾶς* to designate Hyperbolus, and the sophistication of his Athenian audience for its ability to appreciate all the nuances of the Persian word.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> These definitions are from the *Oxford English Dictionary* v (Oxford, 1960), s.v. *knave*.

<sup>14</sup> Eupolis would hardly have given the principal character of his prize-winning play a name which his audience could not understand. B. Graef and E. Langlotz, *Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen* II.3 (Berlin, 1933), p. 127, no. 1512, have published the base of a *skyphos* bearing the possessor's inscription *Μαρικᾶδος*. Was this *Μαρικᾶς* an Asiatic slave whose master gave him this name under the influence of Eupolis' comedy?

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## THEOCRITUS OF CHIOS' EPIGRAM AGAINST ARISTOTLE

In the *Vita Aristotelis* of Diogenes Laertius and elsewhere<sup>1</sup> we come across an epigram of Theocritus of Chios directed against Aristotle. I cite the poem in the form in which it has most recently been published by D. L. Page:<sup>2</sup>

Ἑρμίου εὐνοῦχου τε καὶ Εὐβούλου τόδε δούλου  
σῆμα κενὸν κενόφρων τεύξεν Ἀριστοτέλης,  
ὃς διὰ τὴν ἀκρατῆ γαστρός φύσιν εἴλετο ναίειν  
ἀντ' Ἀκαδημείας βορβόρου ἐν προχοαῖς.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. Laert. 5.11, Didymus, in *Demosth. comm.* 6.45–9, Aristocles ap. Eusebius *PE* 15.2.12, Plutarch, *Mor.* 603e.

<sup>2</sup> *Epigrammata Graeca* (Oxford, 1975), 56.

The story is well known.<sup>3</sup> In 347 B.C., just before Plato's death, Aristotle left the Academy, accepting the invitation to take up residence with his friend Hermias, the philosophically inclined despot of Atarneus. Of dubious origins (he had begun, according to the tradition, as the slave of the previous tyrant of Atarneus, Eubulus) and probably a eunuch,<sup>4</sup> Hermias had visited the Academy after his rise to eminence. Though the extent of his philosophical interests is now difficult for us to determine, it is clear that he had made a favourable impression on Plato<sup>5</sup> and Aristotle. In 341, not long after Aristotle had arrived at the court of Macedon to take up the duties of tutoring the young Alexander, he heard the news that Hermias had been treacherously captured, tortured and put to death by the Persians. To the memory of his friend he erected a cenotaph at Delphi and composed two poems. The one, an epigram, was inscribed on the monument; the other, the famous Hymn to *arete*, was presumably performed in a memorial ceremony.<sup>6</sup> It is in reaction to these events and these poems that Theocritus of Chios writes his epigram.

The punch as delivered in the last line is, of course, well and truly below the belt. As I. Düring rather primly comments, 'the *κενόφρων Ἀριστοτέλης* is a pun on *σῆμα κενόν* and *βορβόρου ἐν προχοαῖς* is a metaphor for the "shameful and dirty relationship with Hermias" as opposed to the serene atmosphere of the Academy'.<sup>7</sup> The ring-composition of the poem is apparent. The climactic words 'outlet of filth' at the end balance the announcement of Hermias' castrated (and by imputation pathic) nature at the beginning.<sup>8</sup> I cannot, however, agree with Düring's further statement<sup>9</sup> that 'there is no reason to see any hidden sense in the words used'.

The object of attack is not Hermias, who in Theocritus' eyes had no doubt met a fitting end, but the philosopher Aristotle. The second couplet gains much in point if we recognize that Theocritus incorporates an undertone of allusion to well-known passages in the Platonic dialogues. In this way he can indicate that the move from the serenity of the Academy to the filth of Asia Minor is also a renunciation of the philosophical principles to which the followers of Plato were meant to subscribe.

With regard to the striking word *βορβόρου*, one might begin by appealing to *Phd.* 69c5, *ὅς ἂν ἀμήτορος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὃ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει*. Even more to the point, however, is the famous passage in *Rep.* 533c7–d2, in which ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος... τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυσγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω. In Plato the unphilosophical soul lies

<sup>3</sup> Various aspects are discussed by G. E. L. Owen, 'Philosophical Invective', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983), 1–25, esp. 8ff.

<sup>4</sup> It might seem foolhardy to persist in entertaining the possibility that Hermias actually was a eunuch. As Owen (art. cit. 15–16) emphatically points out, the charge of sexual deviancy was a stock-in-trade of the orators, from whom it passed to philosophical invective. Yet ultimately it is our modern sense of plausibility that must decide in the concrete case, and here too prejudices can play a role. Maybe we assume too quickly that the noble philosophers Plato and Aristotle could not be on friendly terms with someone who was sexually maimed (*κολοβός*, thus *ἀτελής*), in the way that it used to be assumed that a cricketer was a gentleman and would not be dishonest. At any rate, whether Hermias was or was not a eunuch does not affect the point I am making in this article.

<sup>5</sup> Albeit indirectly; cf. *Ep.* 6.322e6, D. E. L. Wormell, *Yale Classical Studies* 5 (1935), 59.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. 5.6–7.

<sup>7</sup> *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957), 277.

<sup>8</sup> If Diogenes' remark (5.3), *Ἐρμίαν τὸν εὐνοῦχον... ὃν οἱ μὲν φασὶ παιδικὰ γένεσθαι αὐτοῦ*, is based on Theocritus' epigram, as Düring, op. cit. 280 maintains, there is evidence that ancient readers understood it in this way.

<sup>9</sup> Düring, op. cit. 277.

buried not just in filth, but in *barbarian* filth. Was Hermias a *βάρβαρος*? No, says, W. Jaeger, 'he was certainly a Greek, or Aristotle in his hymn could never have represented him as the upholder of the true tradition of Hellenic virtue, in contrast to the barbarians who treacherously killed him'.<sup>10</sup> The rabidly anti-Macedonian Theocritus, however, sees the matter quite differently. Anyone associated with the might of Macedon, who came from Bithynia and was a eunuch into the bargain (if indeed he was), certainly deserved that pejorative epithet. Compare the words of Theopompus in a letter to Philip (*FGH* 115 F 250): οἶος καὶ ὁ Ἑρμίας ἄλλως δὲ χαρίεις καὶ φιλόμουσος γεγονώς· καὶ βάρβαρος μὲν ὢν μετὰ τῶν Πλατωνείων φιλοσοφεῖ, δοῦλος δὲ γενόμενος ἀδηφάγοις ζεύγεσιν ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἀγωνίζεται. Whether this is 'sheer calumny' or not,<sup>11</sup> it illuminates the background of our epigram.

The words in the previous line διὰ τὴν ἀκρατὴ γαστρὸς φύσιν also demand our attention. Though once again typical of the tradition of invective, they too are not without Platonic resonances. Two passages on gluttony spring to mind: *Tim.* 73a4–8 ὅπως μή... ἡ τροφή... διὰ γαστριμαργίαν ἀφιλόσοφον καὶ ἄμουσον πᾶν ἀποτελοῖ τὸ γένος, ἀνυπὴκοον τοῦ θειοτάτου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν; *Phdr.* 238a6–b2 περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τε τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταῦτόν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται. We may reasonably suspect that, were it not for restrictions of metre, Theocritus would have liked to use the *vox Platonica* γαστριμαργία instead of γαστρὸς φύσιν.

If I am right in seeing a reference to reprehensible sexual activity in the final line, then the second couplet in partially explicit and partially allusive terms covers those two areas of the body where ἐπιθυμία and ἀκρασία gain the upper hand. For this coupling one might compare two texts:<sup>12</sup> Xenophon's defence of Socrates' activities, ὃς ἀφροδισίῳ καὶ γαστρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκρατέστατος ἦν (*Mem.* 1.2.1); and the Stoic-Cynic definition of philosophy found later on in the Hellenistic period, φιλοσοφία δὲ ἐγκράτειαν μὲν γαστρός, ἐγκράτειαν δὲ τῶν μετὰ γαστέρα... ἀναδιδάσκει (Philo, *Congr.* 80). This might seem to be labouring the point of what is after all a scurrilous attack. But there is method in Theocritus' rudeness.

Theocritus himself was no Platonist. Just like Theopompus, he stood in the Isocratean tradition and would not have sung the Academy's praises without an ulterior motive.<sup>13</sup> If we look beyond the cruder aspects of its invective, the epigram attacks Aristotle on his own terms. He might pontificate at great length on the βίος φιλόσοφος in works like the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemus*, but his actions by no means match his words; this becomes clear if one compares various pronouncements made by the Academy's founder.

The passages which I have discerned as backdrop to the epigram all belong to the better-known parts of Plato's oeuvre. In the decade after his death they would have been quickly recalled by those whom Theocritus had in mind as audience for his witticism. Later on, it seems, connections were made less easily. Plutarch quotes the

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle: *Fundamentals of the History of his Development* (Eng. trans. Oxford, 1948<sup>2</sup>), 112 n. 2. *Mutatis mutandis* the observation made in n. 8 above applies here as well.

<sup>11</sup> Düring, op. cit. 276, supported by Owen, art. cit. 16.

<sup>12</sup> The place in Plato's works where one would expect this coupling to be worked out in detail is the description of the third part of the soul at *Tim.* 70d ff., but the requirements of the story dictate otherwise (sex comes into the picture when woman is created, 91a–d). But cf. the description of the same part of the soul at *Rep.* 439d6–8, τὸ δὲ ὃ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ θυμῷ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόχεται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον (note also Aristotle, *N.E.* VII 4 1147b25–7).

<sup>13</sup> R. Laqueur, *RE* II 5 (1934), 2025–6.

last one and a half lines in his essay *On exile* (*Mor.* 603e), but he fails to perceive the witty *double entendre* in Theocritus' final words, which appear to indicate a conventional geographical reference<sup>14</sup> but in fact have a much less innocuous intent.<sup>15</sup> If he had recognized the presence of *Rep.* 533c in the background, it might have discouraged him from making the suggestion that *βόρβορος* was the name given by the Madeconians to a river near Pella. For, as Düring rightly observes, the river Borborus owes its existence (and, we might add, its place in Pauly Wissowa's *Realencyclopädie*) entirely to the fertile imagination of the author of this *ad hoc* interpretation.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> *προχολή* in the plural generally refers to the mouth of a river; cf. LSJ *ad loc.*

<sup>15</sup> The reader has no opportunity of checking, because Plutach quotes only the end of the poem. We may assume, I think, that he knew the whole of it.

<sup>16</sup> Düring, *op. cit.* 381; *RE* 3.1 (1897), 720.

### WHAT WORRIED THE CROWS?

A well-known epigram by Callimachus on the philosopher Diodorus Cronus (fr. 393 Pfeiffer) reads as follows:

αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος  
ἔγραφεν ἐν τοίχοις 'ὁ Κρόνος ἐστὶ σοφός'.  
γνῖδε κοὶ κόρακες τεγέων ἐπὶ 'κοῖα συνήπται;  
κρώζουσιν καὶ 'κὼς αὐθι γενησόμεθα;'.<sup>1</sup>

The question of the third line, while perhaps recondite from a contemporary perspective, was clear in antiquity. The crows are asking 'What follows (from what)?', in allusion to the Hellenistic disputes concerning the truth conditions of conditional propositions (*συνημμένα*), disputes in which the views of Diodorus figured prominently.<sup>1</sup>

I agree with Sedley that the question of the last line is 'much more problematic'.<sup>2</sup> The common interpretation has been to read the *αὐθι* as a form of *αὐθις* and to interpret it temporally. The result, in Pfeiffer's estimation, is 'quomodo posthac erimus?'.<sup>3</sup>

This interpretation derives from Sextus Empiricus' discussion at *M.* 1.309–12 of the last two lines of the epigram. After crediting the grammarian with the ability to understand the allusion in the crows' first question (*M.* 1.310: καὶ μέχρι τούτου συνήσει τὸ καὶ παιδίους γνῶριμον), he proceeds to argue that the philosopher has a better chance than the grammarian of understanding the second question. But, to quote Sedley, Sextus 'makes a ghastly mess of it' when he attempts his own elucidation. According to an argument of Diodorus, a living thing does not die in the time in which it lives nor in a time in which it does not live. Hence, Sextus concludes, it must be the case that it never dies and, 'if this is the case, we are always living and, according to him, we shall come to be hereafter (*αὐθις γενησόμεθα*)' (*M.* 1.312).

With respect to an assessment of the adequacy of Sextus' account, I can scarcely do better than quote the comments of Sedley:

<sup>1</sup> See Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 2.110–12 and the discussion in B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), pp. 45–7.

<sup>2</sup> D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 20 (1977), 108 n. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Pfeiffer, *Callimachus* (Oxford, 1949), i.35.